IISc IISc-Intel Resource Center on e-Business
Market Algorithms Intel

Auctions

  • Agorics. A survey of auctions.

  • J. Andreoni and J. Miller. Auctions with artificial adaptive agents. Games and Economic Behavior, 10:39-64, 1995.

  • Lawrence M Ausubel. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. Technical report, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 1997.

  • Lawrence M Ausubel and Peter Cramton. The optimality of being efficient. Technical report, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 1998.

  • Moshe Babaioff and Noam Nisan. Concurrent auctions across the supply chain. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01, pages 1-10, 2001.

  • P. Bajari and A. Hortaqsu. Winner's curse, reserve prices and endogenous entry: Empirical insights from ebay auctions (working paper). Technical report.

  • Ledyard J. O. Banks. J. S. and Porter. D. Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach. The Rand Journal of Economics, 20:1-25, 1989.

  • Salvador Barbera and Matthew O Jackson. Strategy-proof exchange. Econometrica, 63.

  • C. Beam and A. Segev. Auctions on the internet: A field study. Technical Report 98.

  • A. Segev Beam. C. and J. G. Shanthikumar. Optimal design of internet-based auctions. Technical Report 98.

  • C. Beam. Auctions and bidding in electronic commerce: The online auction. Technical report, Ph D Dissertation, University of California Berkeley, USA, 1999.

  • Dimitri P Bertsekas. The auction algorithm: A distributed relaxation method for the assignment problem. Annals of Operation Research, 14:105-123, 1988.

  • Dimitri P Bertsekas and David A Castanon. The auction algorithm for transportation problems. Annals of Operation Research, 20:67-96, 1989.

  • Dimitri P Bertsekas. The auction algorithm for assignment and other network flow problems: A tutorial. Interfaces, 20(4):133-149, 1990.

  • Dimitri P Bertsekas. Auction algorithm for assignment and other network flow problems: A tutorial introduction. Computational Optimization and Applications, 1:7-66, 1992.

  • Kaukal Marion, M. Bichler and Arie Segev. Multi-attribute auctions for electronic procurement. In IBM Advanced Commerce Institute Workshop on Internet Based Negotiation Technologies, 1999.

  • M. Bichler. The Future of eMarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001.

  • M. Bichler. Bidtaker: An application of multi-attribute auction markets in tourism. Technical report, Wirtschafts informatik 2002 Augsburg, Germany, 2002.

  • J. Kalagnanam M. Bichler and H. S. Lee. Reco: Representation and evaluation of configurable offers. Technical report.

  • S. Bikhchandani. Reputation in repeated second-price auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 46:97-119, 1988.

  • S. Bikhchandani and J. W. Mamer. Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities. Journal of Economic Theory, 74:385-413, 1997.

  • Sushil Bikchandani and Joseph M Ostroy. Ascending price vickrey auction. Technical report, Anderson Graduate School of Management and Department of Economics, UCLA, 2000.

  • James Schummer Sushil Bikchandani, Sven de Vries and Rakesh V Vohra. Linear programming and vickrey auctions. Technical report, Anderson Graduate School of Management and Department of Economics, UCLA, 2001.

  • A. Bosch-Domenech and S. Sundar. Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium. Technical report, 1999.

  • M. Goldszmidt C. Boutiller and B. Sabata. Sequential auctions for the allocation of resources with complementarities. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-99), number 16, pages 527-534, 1999.

  • Justin Boyan and Amy Greewald. Bid determination in simultaneous auctions: An agent architecture. pages 210-212, 2001.

  • Paul J Brewer and Charles R Plott. A binary conflict ascending price (bicap) mechanism for the decentralised allocation of the right to use railroad tracks. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14:857-886, 1996.

  • Robert J Cull Mark M Bykowsky and John O Ledyard. Mutually destructive bidding: The fcc auction design problem. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2000.

  • C. Cachin. Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, number 6, page To appear, 1999.

  • C.G. Caplice. An optimization based bidding process: A new framework for shipper-carrier relationsships. Technical report, School of Engineering, MIT, 1996.

  • K. Chui and R. Zwick. Auction on the internet - a preliminary study. Technical report, 1999.

  • Scott H Clearwater (editor). Market based control: A paradigm for distributed resource allocation. World Scientific, 1996.

  • D. Cliff and J. Bruten. Zero is not enough: On the lower limit of agent intelligence for continuous double auction markets. Technical report, HP, 1997.

  • Peter C Cramton. The fcc spectrum auction: an early assessment. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6(3):431-495, 1997.

  • Peter Cramton and Jesse Schwartz. Collusive bidding: Lessons from the fcc spectrum auctions. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17, 2000.

  • Jacques Cremer and McLean Richard. Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interpendent. Econometrica, 53, 345.

  • J.O. Kephart R. Das, J.E. Hanson and G. Tesauro. Agent-human interactions in the continous double auctions. 2001.

  • A. Davenport and J. Kalagnanam. Price negotiations for direct procurement. Research Report RC 22078, IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NJ, USA, 2001.

  • Azoulay-Schwartz R. David, E. and S. Kraus. An english auction protocol for multi-attribute items. 2002.

  • R. Englebrecht-Wiggans and C. M. Kahn. Protecting the winner: Second price vs. ascending bid auctions. Economic Letters, 35:243-248, 1991.

  • Jakka Sairamesh Donald F Ferguson, Christos Nikolaou and Yechiam Yemini. Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems. in clearwater. World Scientific, page 156.

  • M. K. Franklin and M. K. Reiter. The design and implementation of a secure auction server. In IEEE Transaction on Software Engineering, volume 22, pages 302-312, 1998.

  • D. Friedman. The double auction market institution: A survey. 1993.

  • D. McAdams Y. Fujishima and Y. Shoham. Speeding up ascending-bid auctions. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-99), number 16, page 554, 1999.

  • S. Gjerstad and J.Dickhaut. Price formation in double auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 22:1, 1998.

  • J. D. Hartline A. V. Goldberg and A. Wright. Competitive auctions and digital goods. In Proceedings of ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, number 12, 2001.

  • Robert L Graves, Linus Schrage, and Jayaram Sankaran. An auction method for course registration. In Interfaces, pages 23(5):81-92, 1993.

  • Robert L Graves, Linus Schrage, and Jayaram Sankaran. Electronic auctions with private bids. In 3rd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1998.

  • Amy Greenwald and Justin Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A csae study. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01), page 115, 2001.

  • A. Greewald and P. Stone. Autonomous bidding agents in the trading agent competition. In IEEE Internet Computing, 2001.

  • R.M. Kirby A. Greenwald, J. Boyan and J. Reiter. Bid determination in simultaneous auctions.

  • F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. The english auction with different commodities. Journal of Economic Theory, 92:66, 2000.

  • J D Tygar Michael Harkavy and Hiroaki Kikuchi. Electronic auctions with private bids. In In proceedings USENIX workshop on Electronic Commerce, number 3, 1998.

  • M. Herschlag and R. Zwick. Internet auctions-a popular and professional literature review. Electronic Commerce, 1(2).

  • Q. Huai and T. Sandholm. Mobile agents in electronic auction house. 1999.

  • R. Lavi and N. Nisan. Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00).

  • J.H. Kagel. Auctions: A survey of experimental research. 1995.

  • A. J. Davenport J. Kalagnanam and H. S. Lee. Computational aspects of clearing continuous call double auctions with assignment constraints and indivisible demand. Electronic Commerce Research, page 221, 2001.

  • S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari. Innovative auction mechanisms for logistics marketplaces. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, 2001.

  • Paul Klemperer. Auction theory: a guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, page 227, 1999.

  • Paul Klemperer. The economic theory of auctions. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000.

  • M. Kumar and S. I. Feldman. Internet auctions. In Proceedings of Usenix Workshop on Electronic Commerce, number 3, 1999.

  • A. Lazar and N. Semret. The progressive second price auction mechanism for network resource sharing. In International Symposium on Dynamic Games, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 1998.

  • Sigeo Matsubara. Accelerating information revelation in ascending-bid auction - avoiding last minute bidding. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01), page 29, 2001.

  • R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 25:699, 1987.

  • R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Analysing the airwaves auction. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1):159, 1996.

  • S. J. Rassenti K. A. McCabe and V. L. Smith. Designing call auction institutions: Is double dutch the best? The Economic Journal, pages 9-23, 1992.

  • P. Milgrom and R. J. Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50(5):1089, 1982.

  • P. Milgrom and R. J. Weber. The value of information in a sealed-bid auctions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10(1):105, 1982.

  • P. Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: the simultaneous ascending auction.

  • P. Milgrom. Auctions and bidding: a primer. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3):3, 1989.

  • P. Milgrom. Auction Theory for Privatization. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

  • P. Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: The simltaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1999.

  • Paul Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: Asending auctions with package bidding. Technical report, Stanford and MIT, 2000.

  • D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz. K-price auctions (working paper). Technical report, 1998.

  • D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz. Internet auctions (working paper). Technical report, 1998.

  • D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz. Optimal auctions revisited. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-98), number 15, page 32, 1998.

  • Rudolf Muller. Auctions-the big winner among trading mechanisms for the internet economy.

  • Martin J Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. pages 50:1089-1122, 1982.

  • Amir Ronen. On approximating optimal auctions. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01), page 11, 2001.

  • A. E. Roth and A. Ockenfels. Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: theory and evidence from a natural experiment on the internet (working paper). Technical report, 2000.

  • T. Teisberg M. Rothkopf and E. Kahn. Why are vickrey auctions rare? Journal of Political Economy, 98:94-109, 1990.

  • T. W. Sandholm. Limitation of the vickrey auction in computational multiagent systems. In Proceedings of International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS-96), number 2, page 299, 1996.

  • Toumas W Sandholm. Issues in computational vickrey auctions. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 4:107-129, 2000.

  • Mark Stegeman. Participation costs and efficient auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 71:228-259, 1996.

  • J. Teich, H. Wallenius, J. Wallenius, and A. Zaitsev. A multiple unit auction algorithm: Some theory and a web implementation electronic markets. International Journal of Electronic Commerce and Business Media, 9(3):1-7, 1999.

  • William S. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961.

  • P. Wurman W. Walsh, M. Wellman and J. K. MacKie-Mason. Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling. In Proceedings of International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, number 18, 1998.

  • M. P. Wellman. A market-oriented programming environment and its application to distributed multicomodity flow problems. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 1:1, 1993.

  • Michael P Wellman. Market-oriented programming: Some early lessons. pages 74-95, 1996.

  • M.  Wellman and P.  Wurman Real time issues for Internet auctions, number 1, 1998.

  • Wellman. M.P., Walsh. W. E., Wurman. P.R and MacKie-Mason. J. K Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling, number 18, 1998.

  • P. R. Wurman M. P. Wellman, W. E. Walsh and J. K. MacKie-Mason. Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling. Games and Econimic Behavior, 35(1):271, 2001.

  • E. Wolfstetter. Auctions: An introduction. Economic Surveys, 10:367-421, 1996.

  • P.R. Wurman, M.P. Wellman, and W.E. Walsh. The michigan auction bot: A configurable auction server for human software agents. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, AGENTS-98, number 2, 1998.

  • Michael P Wellman Peter R Wurman and William E Walsh. A parameterization of the auction design space.Games and Economic Behavior, 35:304-338, 2001.

LITEC Intel Laboratory for Internet Technologies and E-Commerce
Department of Computer Science and Automation
Indian Institute of Science
CSA