IISc IISc-Intel Resource Center on e-Business Market Algorithms Intel
Combinatorial Auctions

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  • Sushil Bikchandani and Joseph M Ostroy. Ascending price vickrey auctions. Technical report, Anderson Graduate School of Management and Department of Economics, UCLA, September 2001.

  • Sushil Bikchandani, Sven de Vries, james Schummer, and Rakesh V. Vohra. Linear programming and vickrey auctions. Technical report, Anderson Graduate School of Management and Department of Economics, UCLA, May 2001.

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  • Peter Cramton and Jesse Schwartz. Collusive bidding: Lessons from the fcc spectrum auctions. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17, 2000. 152,1

  • V.D. Dang and N.R. Jennings. Optimal clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions with demand-supply function bidding. Technical report, Dept of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, UK, 2003.

  • Pankaj Dayama and Y. Narahari. A generalized vickrey auction with reserve prices for efficient electronic trade. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Operations Research for Development, ICORD 2002, Chennai, 2002.

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  • Christine DeMartini, Anthony M Kwasnica, John O Ledyard, and David Porter. A new and improved design for multi-object iterative auctions. Technical report, California Institute of Technology, 1998.

  • S. de Vries and R. V. Vohra. Combinatorial auctions: A survey. INFORMS Journal of Computing, 15(1), 2003.

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  • Yuzo Fujishima, Kevin Leyton-Brown, and Yoav Shoham. Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-99), pages 548-553, 1999.

  • J. Gallien and L. M. Wein. Design and analysis of a smart market for industrial procurement. Technical report, Operations Research Center, MIT, 2000.

  • Rica Gonen and Daniel Lehmann. Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: Branch and bound heuristics. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), pages 13-20, 2000.

  • R. Gonen and D. Lehmann. Linear programming helps solving large multi-unit combinatorial auctions.

  • G. Hohner, J. Rich, E. Ng, G. Reid, A. J. Davenport, J. R. Kalagnam, H. S. Lee, and C. An. Combinatorial and quantity discount procurement auctions provide benifits to mars and its suppliers. Technical report, IBM Research Report, 2001.

  • Robert C Holte. Combinatorial auctions, knapsack problems, and hill-climbing search. In Canadian Conference on AI, pages 57-66, 2001.

  • H. H. Hoos and C. Boutilier. Solving combinatorial auctions using stochastic local search. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00, 2000.

  • Luke Hunsberger and Barabara J Gross. A combinatorial auction for collaborative planning. In Proceedings International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS-00, pages 151-158, 2000.

  • Joni L. Jones. Incompletely specified combinatorial auction: An alternative allocation mechanism for business-to-business negotiations (Ph.D. thesis), 2000.

  • Joni L. Jones and Gary J. Koehler. Multi-criteria combinatorial auction: A B2B allocation mechanism for substitute goods. Proceedings of the Americas Conference on Information Systems, 2000.

  • J. Kalagnanam and D. Parkes. Auctions, bidding, and exchange design. In Simchi-Levi, D. Wu, and Shen, editors, Supply Chain Analysis in the eBusiness Area. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

  • S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari. Innovative auction mechanisms for logistics marketplaces. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, 2001.

  • R. Kastner, C. Hsieh, M. Potkonjak, and M. Sarrafzadeh. On the sensitivity of incremental algorithms for combinatorial auctions, 2002.

  • Paul Klemperer. Auction theory: a guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, pages 227-286, 1999.

  • A. Kothari, T. Sandholm, and S. Suri. Solving combinatorial exchanges : Optimality via a few partial bids. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-02), 2002.

  • Erhan Kutanoglu and S. David Wu. On combinatorial auction and Lagrangean relaxation for distributed resource scheduling. Technical report, Lehigh University, April, 1998.

  • Porter. D. A Ledyard. J. O and Rangel. A. Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms. Journal of Economic and Management Strategy, 6:639-675, 1997.

  • John O Ledyard, Mark Olson, David porter, Joseph A Swanson, and David Torma. The first use of a combined value auction for transprotation services. Technical Report 1093, Califirnia Institute of Technology, 2000.

  • Daniel Lehmann, Liadan O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-99, pages 96-102, 1999.

  • Benny Lehmann, Daniel Lehmann, and Noam Nisan. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01), pages 18-28, 2001.

  • R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 25:699-738, 1987.

  • J. McMillan. Selling spectrum rights. Journal of Economic Perspectives, pages 145-162, 1994.

  • J. McMillan. Selling spectrum rights. Technical report, University of California, San Diego, 1995.

  • P. Milgrom. Auctions and bidding: a primer. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3):3-22, 1989.

  • P. Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: Asending auctions with package bidding. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2):245-272, 2000.

  • A. Mu'alem and N. Nisan. Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions, 2002. In AAAI (poster), 2002. also presented at Dagstuhl workshop on Electronic Market Design.

  • R. Muller. Auctions - the big winner among trading mechanisms for the internet economy. Technical report, MERIT - Infonomics Memorandum Maastricht, Netherlands, 2001.

  • N. Nisan. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), 2000.

  • N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Computationally feasible vcg-based mechanisms. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 2000.

  • Noam Nisan. The communication complexity of combinatorial auctions. Preprint, 2001.

  • Parkes. D. C. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. In Proceedings of Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (AmEC-99), 1999.

  • Parkes. D. C. ibundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 148-157, 2000.

  • Parkes. D. C and L. H. Ungar. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00, pages 74-81, 2000.

  • Parkes. D. C and Lyle H Ungar. Preventing strategic manipulation in iterative auctions: Proxy agents and price-adjustment. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00), pages 82-89, 2000.

  • Parkes. D. C, Jayant Kalagnanam, and Marta Eso. Vickrey-based surplus distribution in combinatorial exchanges. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), page To appear, 2001. 404,1 63%

  • Parkes. D. C. An iterative generalized vickrey auction: Strategy-proofness without complete revelation. In Proceedings of AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, 2001.

  • Parkes. D. C and Lyle H Ungar. An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. In Proceedings of International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS-01), 2001.

  • Parkes. D. C, J. Kalagnanam, and Marta Eso. Achieving budget-balance with vickrey-based payment schemes in combinatorial exchanges. Technical Report RC 22218 W0110-065, IBM Research Report, 2001.

  • Parkes. D. C and L. H. Ungar. An ascending price generalized vickrey auction. In Summer workshop (Economics of Internet), Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2002.

  • M. Pravin Kumar. Private e-marketplace for procurement: Architecture and algorithms. Technical Report M E Project Report, Dept. of Computer Science & Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India, 2001.

  • V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari. Use of reinforcement learning in iterative bundle auctions for procurement. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, 2001.

  • Rassenti. S. J.and Smith. V. L. and Bulfin. R. L. A combinatorial mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13:402-417, 1982.

  • Michael H. RothKopf, Alexamder P. Pekec, and Ronald M. Harstad Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131-1147, 1998.

  • Yuko Sakurai, Makato yokoo, and siego Matsubara. A limitation of generalized vickrey auction in electronic commerce: Robustness against false-name bids. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-99, volume 16, pages 86-92, 1999.

  • Yuko Sakurai, Makato Yokoo, and Koji Kamel. An efficient approximate algorithm for winner determination in combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), pages 30-37, 2000.

  • Sandholm. T. An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal-cost calculations. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-93), number 11, pages 361-395, 1993. 474,1

  • Sandholm. T and Victor R Lesser. Issues in automated negotiation and electronic commerce: Extending the contract net framework. In Proceedings of International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS-95), number 1, pages 328-335, 1995.

  • Sandholm. T. An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-99, pages 542-547, 1999.

  • Sandholm. T and S. Suri. Improved algorithms for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2000, pages 90-97, 2000.

  • Sandholm. T. emediator: A next generation electronic commerce server. In Proceedings of International Conference on Autonomous Agents (Agents-2000), number 4, pages 341-348, 2000.

  • Sandholm. T, S. Suri, A. Gilpin, and D. Levine. Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations. In Proceedings of International Conference on Autonomous Agents (Agents-2001, 2001.

  • Sandholm. T, S. Suri, A. Gilpin, and D. Levine. Cabob: A fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions. In International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), Seattle, Washington, USA, pages 1102-1108, 2001.

  • Sandholm. T. An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 135(1):1-54, 2002.

  • Sandholm. T and S. Suri. Bob: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. Artificial Intelligence, 145:33-58, 2003.

  • Y. Shi. Combinatorial auctions : Mathematical formulations. International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making, 2(1), 2003.

  • T. Smith, T. Sandholm, and R. Simmons. Constructing and clearing combinatorial exchanges using preference elicitation. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-02), 2002.

  • J. Song and A. C. Regan. Combinatorial auctions for transportation since procurement : The carrier perspective. Technical report, Institutee of Transportation Studies, University of California, Irvine, 2002.

  • M. Tennenholtz. Some tractable combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00, 2000.

  • J.K. MacKie-Mason and H. Varian. Generalized vickrey auctions. Technical report, University of Michigan, 1995.

  • H.  R.  Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. Technical report, University of California, Berkeley, 2000.

  • W. Vickrey. Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tender. Journal of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961.

  • W. E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman, and Fredrik Ygge. Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), pages 260-269, 2000.

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  • P. R. Wurman. Market structure and multidimensional auction design for computational economies (ph.d dissertation). Technical report, University of Michigann, 1999.

  • Wurman. P. R. and Wellman. M. P. Equilibrium prices in bundle auctions.

  • Peter R. Wurman and Michael P. Wellman. Akba: A progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), pages 21-29, 2000.

  • Y. Sakurai M. Yokoo and S. Matsubara. Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2000, number 17, pages 110-116, 2000.

  • Edo Zurel and Noam Nisan. An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01), pages 125-136, 2001.
LITEC Intel Laboratory for Internet Technologies and E-Commerce
Department of Computer Science and Automation
Indian Institute of Science 		CSA