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REFEREED CONFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

Pankaj Dayama, Aditya Karnik, and Y. Narahari. Optimal Incentive Timing Strategies for Product Marketing on Social Networks Accepted for Presentation at AAMAS-2012 (Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems), Valencia, Spain June 4–8, 2012.

Incentive strategies are key to the success of any viral marketing campaign. In this paper, we focus on two common types of incentive programs: (1) direct incentives to potential buyers (influence) and referral rewards for customers who influence potential buyers (exploit connections). Our objective is to find an optimal way of sequencing and scheduling these two incentive programs over a finite time horizon. We take a mean field approach to the problem and formulate the problem as a continuous time deterministic optimal control problem. The optimal strategy has a simple, elegant structure and takes one of two forms: influence and exploit or exploit and influence.

Swapravanath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, and Chris Dance. Dynamic Mechanism Design for Markets with Strategic Resources. Proceedings of International Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-2011), Barcelona, Spain, pp. 539-546.

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.

D. Premm Raj and Y. Narahari Influence Limitation in Multi-Campaign Social Networks: A Shapley Value Approach. Proceedings of the Centenary Conference in Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, December 2011.

We investigate the problem of influence limitation in the presence of competing campaigns in a social network. Given a negative campaign which starts propagating from a specified source and a positive/counter campaign that is initiated, after a certain time delay, to limit the the influence or spread of misinformation by the negative campaign, we are interested in finding the top $k$ influential nodes at which the positive campaign may be triggered. This problem has numerous applications in situations such as limiting the propagation of rumor, arresting the spread of virus through inoculation, initiating a counter-campaign against malicious propaganda, etc. The influence function for the generic influence limitation problem is non-submodular. Restricted versions of the influence limitation problem, reported in the literature, assume submodularity of the influence function and do not capture the problem in a realistic setting. In this paper, we propose a novel computational approach for the influence limitation problem based on Shapley value, a solution concept in cooperative game theory. Our approach works equally effectively for both submodular and non-submodular influence functions. Experiments on standard real world social network datasets reveal that the proposed approach outperforms existing heuristics in the literature. As a non-trivial extension, we also address the problem of influence limitation in the presence of multiple competing campaigns.

Mayur Mohite and Y. Narahari. Incentive Compatible Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Application to Viral Marketing. Proceedings of International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-2011), Taipei, Taiwan, pp. 1081-1082.

The literature on influence maximization in social networks assumes that influence probabilities are available. However this is rarely true. This paper proposes a mechanism design approach to elicit influence probability information from the nodes themselves.

A. Radhika, Y. Narahari, Deepak Bagchi, P. Suresh, and S.V. Subrahmanya. Optimal Allocation of Carbon Credits to Emitting Agents. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE-2010)}, Toronto, August 22-24, 2010, pp. 275-280.

S. Biswas and Y. Narahari. An Iterative Auction Mechanism for Combinatorial Exchanges. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE-2010)}, Toronto, August 22-24, 2010, pp 849-854.

S. Biswas and Y. Narahari. Tatonnement Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (CEC-2010), Shanghai, China, November 2010, pp. 25-31.

K. Nagaraj and Y. Narahari. Threshold Behavior of Incentives in Social Networks. Proceedings of the 19th ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM), Toronto, Canada, October 2010, pp. 1461-1464.

Devansh Dikshit and Y. Narahari Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks. Proceedings of WINE 2009 (Workshop on Internet and Network Economics), Rome, Italy. Stefano Leonardi (Editor), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-5929, pp. 386-397. December 2009.

Query incentive networks, proposed by Jon Kleinberg and Prabhakar Raghavan in 2005, capture the role of incentives in extracting information from decentralized information networks (such as social networks). Game theoretic models have been formulated and studied for characterizing the dependence of the monetary incentive required to extract the information on various factors such as the network structure, the level of difficulty of the query, required success probability, etc. Our contribution in this paper is to incorporate a practical and important factor, namely, quality of answers, in the monitization of query incentive networks. We propose truthful quality elicitation mechanisms by finding a connection to the brilliant, decades-old work on scoring rules by Nobel Laureate Richard Selten. We also investigate the budget balance properties of the proposed mechanisms.

Sujit Gujar and Y. Narahari. Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. Proceedings of FAMAS 2009 (Formal Approaches to Multi-Agent Systems), Torino, Italy, September 2009.

There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem satisfying weak budget balance, individual rationality, and minimizing the budget imbalance. This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. Our main result is an impossibility theorem which rules out linear rebate functions with non-zero efficiency in heterogeneous object assignment. Motivated by this theorem, we explore two approaches to get around this impossibility. In the first approach, we show that linear rebate functions with nonzero efficiency are possible when the valuations for the objects have some relationship. In the second approach, we show that rebate functions with non-zero efficiency are possible if linearity is relaxed.

T.S. Chandrashekar and Y. Narahari. On the Incentive Compatible Core of a Procurement Network Formation game with Incomplete Information. Proceedings of FAMAS 2009 (Formal Approaches to Multi-Agent Systems), Torino, Italy, September 2009.

Sriram Somanchi, Chaitanya Nittala, and Y. Narahari. A Novel Bid Optimizer for Sponsored Search Auctions based on Cooperative Game Theory. Proceedings of IEEE/WIC/ACM Conference on Intelligent Agent Technologies, Milano, Italy, September 2009, pp. 435-438.

Ramakrishnan Kannan, Dinesh Garg, Kartik Subbian, and Y. Narahari. Nash Bargaining Based Ad Networks for Sponsored Search Auctions. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (IEEE CEC-2009). Vienna, Austria, July 2009, pp. 170-175.

S. Biswas and Y. Narahari. Approximately Efficient Iterative Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (IEEE CEC-2009). Vienna, Austria, July 2009, pp. 182-187.

N. Ramasuri and Y. Narahari. Stability and Efficiency of Social Networks with Strategic, Resource Constrained Nodes. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (IEEE CEC-2009). Vienna, Austria, July 2009, pp. 188-193.

Recently, the topic of social network formation has received significant attention since the structure of the networks has a profound impact on the economic outcomes in many real world applications such as large exchange markets, sponsored search auctions, and viral marketing. Stability and efficiency are two important properties which are sought in such networks. These two properties are both desirable but not always compatible. This paper investigates the tradeoff between stability and efficiency in a noncooperative game model of social network formation. In our model, we consider network formation in which each node can form at most k links due to scarcity of the resources. We formulate the network formation process as a strategic form game.We view the notion of stability as obtaining a Nash equilibrium outcome and efficiency as maximizing the value of the network. In this setting, we show that all efficient networks are stable in both the cases: (i) k = 1 and (ii) k = 2.

Sujit Gujar and Y. Narahari. Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (IEEE CEC-2009). Vienna, Austria, July 2009, pp. 74-81.

The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when the bidders are single minded. We develop a procurement auction that minimizes the cost of procurement while satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. Under appropriate regularity conditions, this optimal auction also satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The results presented here hold true for equivalent forward auction settings as well.

Sujit Gujar and Y. Narahari. Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. 4th International Workshop On Internet And Network Economics (WINE), December, Shanghai, China, 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pages: 438-445.

In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p) with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, individual rational- ity, and minimizing the budget imbalance. This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. When the objects are identical, this prob- lem has earlier been solved by Moulin and Guo and Conitzer. However, it remains an open problem to design such a rebate function when the ob- jects are heterogeneous. We propose a mechanism, HETERO and conjec- ture that HETERO is individually rational and weakly budget balanced. We provide empirical evidence for our conjecture through experimental simulations.

Prashanth Bandaru and Y. Narahari. Efficient Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Volume Discounts Arising in Web Service Composition. Fourth Annual IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE), Washington, DC, USA, August 2008, pages: 995-1000.

Ashwin Bellur, Y. Narahari, Shantanu Biswas. Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Business Clusters with Strategic Firms. Fourth Annual IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE), Washington, DC, USA, August 2008, pages: 1001-1006.

Ramakrishnan Kannan, Dinesh Garg, Karthik Subbian, Y. Narahari. A Nash Bargaining Approach to Retention Enhancing Bid Optimization in Sponsored Search Auctions with Discrete Bids. Fourth Annual IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE), Washington, DC, USA, August 2008, pages: 1007-1012.

N. Ramasuri and Y. Narahari. Determining Top K Nodes in Social Networks using the Shapley Value. Seventh International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS-2008, Estoril, Portugal, May 2008, pages: 1509-1512.

In this paper, we consider the problem of selecting, for any given positive integer k, the top-k nodes in a social network, based on a certain measure appropriate for the social network. This problem is relevant in many settings such as analysis of co-authorship networks, diffusion of information, viral marketing, etc. However, in most situations, this problem turns out to be NP-hard. The existing approaches for solving this problem are based on approximation algorithms and assume that the objective function is sub-modular. In this paper, we propose a novel and intuitive algorithm based on the Shapley value, for efficiently computing an approximate solution to this problem. Our proposed algorithm does not use the sub-modularity of the underlying objective function and hence it is a general approach. We demonstrate the efficacy of the algorithm using a co-authorship data set from e-print arXiv (www.arxiv.org), having 8361 authors.

Megha Mohabey, Y. Narahari, M. Sudeep, P. Suresh, and S.V. Subrahmanya. An intelligent procurement marketplace for web services composition. Proceedings of the IEEE/ACM/WIC Conference on Web Intelligence, WI-07, Silicon Valley, November 2007, pages: 551-554.

Karthik Subbian, Ramakrishnan Kannan, Raghav Gautham, and Y. Narahari. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Group Ticket Allocation in Software Maintenance Services. Proceedings of the Asia Pacific Software Engineering Conference, Nagoya, Japan, December 3-5, 2007, pages: 270-277.

T. S. Chandrashekar and Y. Narahari. A Shapley Value Analysis to Coordinate the Formation of Procurement Networks. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering, CASE 2007, Scottsdale, Arizona, September 2007, pages: 664-669.

Megha Mohabey, Y. Narahari, M. Sudeep, P. Suresh, and S.V. Subrahmanya. A combinatorial procurement auction for QoS-aware web services composition. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering, CASE 2007, Scottsdale, Arizona, September 2007, pages: 716-721.

T.S. Chandrashekar and Y. Narahari. The Core and Shapley Value Analysis for Cooperative Formation of Procurement Networks. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2007), Tokyo, Japan, July 2007, pp. 175-182.

Y. Narahari and Nikesh Kumar Srivastava. A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Decentralized Supply Chain Formation. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2007), Tokyo, Japan, July 2007. pp. 315-322.

D.Garg, Y. Narahari, and S.S. Reddy. Design of an Optimal Auction for Sponsored Search Auctions. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2007), Tokyo, Japan, July 2007, pp. 439-442.

Karthik Subbian and Y. Narahari. Truth Eliciting Mechanisms for Trouble Ticket Allocation in Software Maintenance Services. Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Conference on Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, SEKE'2007, Boston, USA, July 2007, pages: 355-340.

Raghav Gautham, N. Hemachandra, Hastagiri, Y. Narahari. Optimal Auctions for Multi-Unit Procurement with Volume Discount Bids. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2007), Tokyo, Japan, July 2007, pp. 21-28.

N. Ramasuri and Y. Narahari. Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach. Proceedings of IEEE/Create-Net COMSWARE 2007, International Conference on COmmunication System softWAre and MiddlewaRE, Bangalore, January 2007.

S. Sivasankar Reddy and Y. Narahari. in advertisement Bidding Dynamics of Rational Advertisers in Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web. Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Control and Optimization of Dynamical Systems, ACODS-2007, Bangalore, February 2007.

Hastagiri Prakash and Y. Narahari. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Resource Procurement in Computational Grids with Rational resource Providers. Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Control and Optimization of Dynamical Systems, ACODS-2007, Bangalore, February 2007.

Hastagiri Prakash and Y. Narahari. A Strategy Proof Auction Mechanism for Scheduling Grids with Selfish Entities. Proceedings of WEBIST 2006, Second International Conference on Web Information Systems, Setbal, Portugal, April 2006, pages: 178-183.

Y. Narahari and T.S. Chandrashekar. Optimal Design of Procurement Auctions. Proceedings of GM India Science Lab International Workshop on Frontiers of E-Business, December 9-10, 2005, Bangalore.

Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, Earnest Foster, Devadatta M. Kulkarni, and Jeffrey D. Tew. A Groves Mechanism Approach to Decentralized Design of Supply Chains. IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2005), Munchen, Germany, July 2005, pages: 330-337.

Dinesh Garg, and Y. Narahari. Price of Anarchy of Network Routing Games with Incomplete Information. First Workshop on Network and Internet Economics, WINE-2005, Hong Kong, December 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volumer 3828, pp. 1066-1075.

Dinesh Garg, and Y. Narahari. Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems. First Workshop on Network and Internet Economics, WINE-2005, Hong Kong, December 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volumer 3828, pp. 718-727.

T.S. Chandrashekar and Y. Narahari. Economic Mechanisms for Shortest Path Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information. First Workshop on Network and Internet Economics, WINE-2005, Hong Kong, December 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volumer 3828, pp. 70-79.

S. Kameshwaran, and Y. Narahari. A Lagrangian Heuristic for Bid Evaluation in e-Procurement Auctions. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering, (IEEE CASE 2005), Edmonton, Canada, August 2005, pages: 220-225.

Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari, and Anish Das Sarma. A Decomposition Based Approach for Design of Supply Aggregation and Demand Aggregation Exchanges. Workshop on Theory Building and Formal Methods in Electronic/Mobile Commerce (TheFormEMC), October 2004, Toledo, Spain, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 3236, Springer-Verlag, 2004, pp. 58-71.

Y. Narahari and Shantanu Biswas An Iterative Auction Mechanism for Combinatorial Logistics Exchanges. The 9th International Symposium on Logistics. 11-14 July 2004.

Pankaj Dayama and Y. Narahari. Design of Multi-Unit Electronic Exchanges through Decomposition. Proceedings of the International Workshop on Manufacturing, Logistics, and Supply Chain Management, Bangalore, December 2003.

K.N. Rajanikanth, Y. Narahari, NNSSRK Prasad, and R.S. Rao. A Robust Software Architecture for Simulation of Airborne Radars, Proceedings of IEEE Region-10 Conference, TENCON-2003, Bangalore, October 2003, pp . 173-177.

K.N. Rajanikanth, Y. Narahari, NNSSRK Prasad, and R.S. Rao. Airborne Radar Data Processor Simulation Using Software-in-the-Loop Model. Proceedings of India Radar Symposium, IRSI-2003, 2003.

K.N. Rajanikanth, Y. Narahari, NNSSRK Prasad, and R.S. Rao. A Robust Design of Airborne Radar Simulation Software using Design Patterns, Proceedings of the National Conference on Object Oriented Technology, NCOOT-2003, Lonere, Maharashtra, August 2003.

D.Garg, Y. Narahari, N. Viswanadham. Design of Six Sigma Supply Chains. Proceedings of ICRA-2003, IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Taipei, Taiwan, October 2003,pp . 1737-1742.

D.Garg, Y. Narahari, N. Viswanadham. A new approach to achieving sharp and timely deliveries in supply chain networks. Proceedings of IROS-2003, IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, Las Vegas, October 2003,pp . 2315-2320.

C.V.L. Raju, Y. Narahari, and K. Ravi Kumar. Reinforcement learning applications in dynamic pricing of retail markets. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce, CEC-2003, New Port Beach, California, June 2003, pp. 339-346.

S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari. Trade Determination in Multi-attribute exchanges. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce, CEC-2003, New Port Beach, California, June 2003, pp. 173-180.

S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari. E-procurement using goal programming. To appear in the Proceedings of EC-Web 2003, International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies, DEXA 2003 Conferences, Linz, Austria, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Volume 2738, Pages 6-15, 2003.

C. V. L. Raju, Y. Narahari, Reinforcement Learning Applications in Dynamic Pricing of Retail Markets. International Conference on Operations Research for Development. ICORD 2002, Chennai, December 27-30, 2002.

Pankaj Dayama and Y. Narahari, A Generalized Vickrey Auction with Reserve Prices for Efficient Electronic Trade. International Conference on Operations Research for Development. ICORD 2002, Chennai, December 27-30, 2002.

Y. Narahari, Maria Praveen Yatagiri, and Y. Ravi Shankar, IMPROVE: An innovative private marketplace for e-procurement. First EuroAsia Workshop on I-Manufacturing and E-Commerce. Mumbai, December 2002.

C.V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Dynamic pricing of retail markets using reinforcement learning. First EuroAsia Workshop on I-Manufacturing and E-Commerce. Mumbai, December 2002.

S. Biswas and Y. Narahari, A novel iterative reverse Dutch auction for combinatorial auctions. First EuroAsia Workshop on I-Manufacturing and E-Commerce. Mumbai, December 2002.

D. Garg and Y. Narahari, Design of six sigma supply chains. First EuroAsia Workshop on I-Manufacturing and E-Commerce. Mumbai, December 2002.

Sourav Sen and Y. Narahari, Improving web server performance by network aware data buffering and caching. International Conference on High Performance Computing, HiPC 2002, Bangalore, December 2002, pp . 242-251.

S. Biswas and Y. Narahari, Iterative reverse dutch auction for electronic procurement. To be presented at the International Conference on Electronic Commerce Research, ICECR-5, Montreal, Canada, December 2002.

S. Biswas and Y. Narahari, Supplier competition in electronic marketplaces. To be presented at the International Conference on Electronic Commerce Research, ICECR-5, Montreal, Canada, December 2002.

S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari, A new approach to the design of electronic exchanges. To be presented at EC-Web 2002, International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies, Aix-en-Provence, France, September 2002, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 2455, pages 27-36, 2002.

C.V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Queueing network modeling and lead time compression of electronic procurement. Proceedings of ICRA-2002, IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Washington, DC, USA, May 2002 ,pp . 763-768.

D. Garg, Y. Narahari, and N. Viswanadham, Achieving sharp deliveries in supply chains through variance pool allocation. Proceedings of ICRA-2002, IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Washington, DC, USA, May 2002, pp. 2345-2350.

S. Biswas and Y. Narahari, Analysis of supplier competition in electronic marketplaces. Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, December 2001.

D. Garg and Y. Narahari, A process capability indices based approach for supply chain performance analysis. Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, December 2001.

S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari, Innovative auction mechanisms for logistics marketplaces. Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, December 2001.

V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Use of reinforcement learning in iterative bundle auctions for procurement. Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, December 2001.

V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Effect of Internet Technologies on the Performance of the Procurement Process. Proceedings of All India Manufacturing, Design, and Research Conference, Chennai, December 2000.

Y. Narahari and S. Rajesh, Implementing Reverse Auctions and Double Auctions: An Experiment in Extending an Object Oriented Auction Package. Proceedings of: NCOOT-2000, National Conference on Object Oriented Technology, November 2000.

V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Effect of Internet Technologies on the Performance of the Procurement Process. Technical Report, Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, June 2000.  Also to appear in: Proceedings of All India Manufacturing, Design, and Research Conference, Chennai, December 2000.

Shantanu Biswas, S. Kameswaran, and Y. Narahari, Using combinatorial auctions in forecasting and production planning. Technical Report, Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, June 2000.  Also to appear in: Proceedings of All India Manufacturing, Design, and Research Conference, Chennai, December 2000.

Y. Narahari and S. Rajesh, Implementing Reverse Auctions and Double Auctions: An Experiment in Extending an Object Oriented Auction Package. Technical Report, Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, August 2000.  Submitted to: NCOOT-2000, National Conference on Object Oriented Technology, November 2000.

Y. Narahari, K.N. Rajanikanth, and Sourav Sen, WHAT: A Web-enabled Internet Auction House. Technical Report, Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, August 2000.  Submitted to: NCOOT-2000, National Conference on Object Oriented Technology, November 2000.

Y. Narahari and S. Biswas. Supply Chain Management: Modeling and Decision Making. Invited paper. International Conference on Flexible Autonomous Manufacturing Systems, Coimbatore Institute of Technology, Coimbatore, January 2000

Y. Narahari, N. Viswanadham, and R. Bhattacharya, Design of synchronized supply chains: A six sigma tolerancing approach. Submitted to ICRA-2000, International Conference on Robotics and Automation, pp . 1151-1156.

S. Aithal, Y. Narahari, and E.S. Manjunath, Modeling, Analysis, and Acceleration of a Printed Circuit Board Fabrication Process. Proceedings of the International Conference on Operations Management for Global Economy, POMS-99, New Delhi, December 1999

S. Biswas and Y. Narahari. Object Oriented Modeling for Decision support in supply chain networks. Proceedings of the International Conference on Operations Management for Global Economy, POMS-99, New Delhi, December 1999

S. Aithal, Y. Narahari, and E.S. Manjunath, Modeling and Acceleration of a PCB Design Process. Proceedings of the Second Indian Operations Management Workshop, Bangalore, December 1998.

S. Biswas and Y. Narahari DESSCOM: Object Oriented Infrstructure for Decision support in supply chain networks. Proceedings of the Second Indian Operations Management Workshop, Bangalore, December 1998.

R. Sudarsan, Y. Narahari, K.W. Lyons, M.R. Duffey, and R.D. Sriram, Design for tolerance of electro-mechanical assemblies: An integrated approach. Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, ICRA-98, Belgium, May 1998, pp . 1490-1497.

Y. Narahari, K.W. Lyons, and M.R. Duffey, Lead time modeling and acceleration of product realization processes. INFORMS Joint National Meeting, Dallas, Texas, October 1997.

Y. Narahari, R. Sudarsan, K.W. Lyons, M.R. Duffey, and R.D. Sriram, An integrated approach for design tolerancing of electro-mechanical assemblies. Proceedings of the Third Seminar on Assembly Modeling and Tolerancing, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, October 1997.

K. Ravikumar and Y. Narahari, Dynamic Scheduling of multiclass manufacturing systems with setups. Proceedings of the International Conference on Agile Manufacturing, Bangalore, February 1996, pp. 30-36.

N. Hemachandra and Y. Narahari, A linear programming approach to optimal scheduling in a stochastic manufacturing system. Proceedings of the International Conference on Agile Manufacturing, Bangalore, February 1996, pp. 22-29.

Y. Narahari and N. Hemachandra, Non-stationary models of manufacturing systems: Relevance and analysis. Proceedings of the 10th IEEE Intl Symposium on Intelligent Control, Monterey, California, USA, August 1995,pp . 298-303.

Y. Narahari, N. Hemachandra, and M. S. Gaur, Transient analysis of a multiclass production facility with priority scheduling. Proceedings of the SME International Conference on Computer Integrated Manufacturing, Singapore, June 1995, pp. 654-661.

Y. Narahari, L. M. Khan, and S. Sridhar, Modeling the Effect of Hot Lots in Semiconductor Manufacturing Systems. Proceedings of the SME International Conference on Computer Integrated Manufacturing, Singapore, June 1995, pp. 671-678.

Y. Narahari and L. M. Khan, Modeling re-entrant manufacturing systems with inspections. Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Nagoya, Japan, May 1995, pp. 1738-1743.

Y. Narahari and R. Srigopal, A hybrid scheduling algorithm for multiclass production systems with setup times. Proceedings of the Rensselaer's Fourth International Conference on Computer Integrated Manufacturing and Automation Technology, Troy, New York, USA, August 1994.

Y. Narahari and R. Srigopal, A Lagrangian relaxation based scheduling algorithm for a flexible manufacturing system. Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Computer Aided Design and Computer Aided Manufacture, Coimbatore, August 1994.

Y. Narahari and V. Sastry, Performance of a Brownian scheduling policy in a multiclass make-to-stock manufacturing system. Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Computer Aided Design and Computer Aided Manufacture, Coimbatore, August 1994.

M. S. Gaur and Y. Narahari, Transient analysis of a flexible manufacturing system with centralised material handling. Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Computer Aided Design and Computer Aided Manufacture, Coimbatore, August 1994.

Y. Narahari and Sundar Ram Vedula, Real-world extensions to a production scheduling algorithm based on Lagrangian relaxation. Proceedings of 1994 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, San Diego, California, USA, May 1994, Volume 4, pp. 3167-3172.

Y. Narahari, Analysis of distributed scheduling policies in re-entrant lines. Proceedings of the NSF Workshop on Hierarchical Control for Real-Time Scheduling of Manufacturing Systems, Lincoln, New Hampshire, USA, October 1992.

C. R. M. Sundaram and Y. Narahari, Modelling and analysis of time variance of parallelism in parallel computations. Proceedings of IEEE TENCON'91, Sixth IEEE Region-10 Conference, New Delhi, India, August 1991.

N. Viswanadham, T. L. Johnson, and Y. Narahari, Performance analysis of automated manufacturing systems with blocking and deadlock. Proceedings of Rensselaer's Second International Conference on Computer Integrated Manufacturing, Troy, New York, USA, May 1990, pp . 64-68.

N. Viswanadham and Y. Narahari, Analytical modelling of flexible manufacturing systems. Proceedings of the Symposium on Advanced Remote Handling Systems and Automation in Nuclear Installations, Bombay, India, March 1990, pp. 279-284.

Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Performance models of local area network protocols. In: Systems and Signal Processing. Proceedings of the Indo-US Workshop on Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, January 1988, Tata-McGraw Hill, New Delhi, India, 1990.

N. Viswanadham and Y. Narahari, Performance models of integrated manufacturing systems, In: Systems and Signal Processing. Proceedings of the Indo-US Workshop on Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, January 1988, Tata-McGraw Hill, New Delhi, India, 1990.

Y. Narahari, K. Suriyanarayanan, and N. V. Subba Reddy, Discrete event simulation of distributed systems using stochastic Petri nets. Proceedings of TENCON'89, Fourth IEEE Region-10 Conference, Bombay, India, November 1989, pp. 622-625.

Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Performance evaluation of computer systems using Petri nets with deterministic and stochastic timed transitions. Proceedings of IEEE TENCON'87, Third IEEE Region-10 Conference, Seoul, South Korea, August 1987.

N. Viswanadham and Y. Narahari, Coloured Petri net models for automated manufacturing systems. Proceedings of the 1987 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, San Diego, California, USA, March 1987, pp. 1985--1990.

Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Performance modelling of local area distributed systems using stochastic Petri nets. Proceedings of the Platinum Jubilee Conference on Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, December 1986, pp. 304--308.

Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Coloured Petri net models of generalized manufacturing systems. Proceedings of the Seventh European Workshop on Applications and Theory of Petri Nets, Oxford, England, July 1986, pp. 243--263.

Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, A Petri net-based investigation of deadlocks in automated manufacturing systems. In: CAD/CAM/CAE for Industial Progress, Edited by V. Rajaraman, North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1986, pp. 119--131.

Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Analysis and synthesis of flexible manufacturing systems using Petri nets. Proceedings of the First ORSA/TIMS Special Interest Conference on Flexible Manufacturing Systems: Models and Methods, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, August 1984.

Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, An efficient methodology for computation of place invariants in Petri nets. Proceedings of the National Systems Conference, Bombay, India, 1984.

Y. Narahari and M. Kamath, Modelling and analysis of manufacturing systems by Petri nets. Award Winning Paper in the IEEE India Student Paper Contest, 1984.